By Adam H.
As a referendum for Moldova’s accession to the EU is to be held this year, October 20th, many interested parties seem to address this crucial process through a divide et impera optics. Some address the situation of this small, but courageous republic, by referring to its seemingly permanent pendulum between West and East (an ideological approach), others seem to analyze it through the optics of a country being economically unsustainable, considering some decades to come. Fair-enough approaches, one could argue. But aside of the ideologically versus economically dilemma, there are still pseudo-researchers who reduce Moldova to a question that has its roots in ethnical auto-determination and maybe self-preservation. A bull approach, if it had not been in question since Homo Sovieticus surfaced in mid ‘70s.
Let us refer to the latter approach, as it is resurfacing again in the midst of the EU referendum. And where does it resurface? In the heart of Brussels, in a ‘thorough’, or at least fairly long research, conducted by Oleg Ignatov, intitled “Moldova Divided: Easing Tensions as Russia Meddles and Elections Approach”, and published by the International Crisis Group on its website (https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/moldova/b97-moldova-divided-easing-tensions-russia-meddles).
One might believe the article is intended to be an alarm signal regarding the fact that “as Moldova has turned to the West following Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, it has also toughened its approach toward two regions – breakaway Transnistria and autonomous Gagauzia – that have courted Russian support”. Also, might be regarded as a signal that „the Moldovan government’s heavy-handed treatment of Transnistria and Gagauzia has led to greater internal tensions”. As one can read, a call, somewhere out there, to respecting minorities’ rights.
Some words about the author, the researcher Oleg Ignatov. He is International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Russia, and had previously worked as a political consultant at the Center for Current Policy in Moscow. This Center is being headed by Alexey Chesnakov (former Head of Information and Analytical Planning of the Russian Presidential Administration, former Chairman of the Public Council Presidium of the General Council of the political party “United Russia”, respectively former Deputy Secretary of the General Council of the political party “United Russia”, which supports the policies of Vladimir Putin, and who had served as party leader during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev). Also, like Alexey Chesnakov, Oleg Ignatov had worked for the political party “United Russia”, as a political consultant. Has the author transformed from an “United Russia” supporter to an EU minorities’ rights whistle-blower?
Oleg Ignatov poses as the one who wants to contribute to finding solutions so that the Republic of Moldova will not be diverted from EU accession path, using words which highlight the fact that Transnistria and Gagauzia are being used by the Russian Federation to destabilize the Republic of Moldova and to block EU accession. And by using this pro-Moldovan wording, later in the text the author is implying that these two regions’ residents are ‘victims’ of Chisinau’s government vengeful actions, and in fact Chisinau is to blame for ‘tensioning relations’ between central authorities and leaders of these two separatist/autonomous regions.
Obviously, Oleg Ignatov would not have been able to convince of this kind of shady argument if he were to report constructively and equidistantly to the way Chisinau acts to support the population of Transnistria and Gagauzia! Probably that is why, Ignatov applies a well-known recipe of the Russians propagandists – the use of fake news!
As one cannot just criticize a man’s work without a shell of proof, here are some (of the many) ideas (to be read borderline fake news) perpetrated by Oleg Ignatov in his article:
First of all, he is trying to induce that “many European and EU officials” would not agree with the idea expressed by EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell, who mentioned that “Moldova could follow the model of still-divided EU member Cyprus – join the block first, then try to resolve its division later”, when answering a question about the fact that “Transnistria could complicate Moldova’s path to EU membership”. Oleg Ignatov does not indicate how many or who exactly are those European and EU officials, nor does he indicate a concrete bibliographic source, where one could find these references. He indicates but only an interview with a ‘senior EU official’ which would have been carried out in March 2024, by International Crisis Group, the website he works for and which publishes his analysis. A respected journalist or researcher would argue that this kind of reference is not a deontological approach (to quote independent or use clearly indicated sources).
Secondly, the author is raising the alarm of the deprivation of liberty of the citizens of Transnistria, indicating that „in March 2023 the Moldovan Parliament outlawed political demands for Transnistria’s separation from greater Moldova, making them punishable by imprisonment”. In fact, the law adopted by the Moldovan Parliament does not speak of “political demands for Transnistria’s separation”, but provides in favor of the completion of the Criminal Code with notions which criminalize the acts related to the crimes of espionage and treason: the initiation, organization or establishment of illegal informative structures, instigation of other persons to commit actions that harm sovereignty, independence, territorial inviolability, state security or defense capacity, actions (not ‘political demands’) carried out with the aim of separating a part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the distribution of information that incites such actions. In an attempt to describe a state of fear that the respective law would induce in Transnistria, Oleg Ignatov cites the fact that “Transnistria’s high-ranking de facto officials fear they could be arrested and no longer dare to leave the region”, but does not mention who exactly are these officials. He is only citing a ‘Transnistrian official’, who did not state that he was afraid of being arrested, but only that “Moldova refuses to explain to us [Transnistrians] how it intends to apply the law and does not respond to our requests”. Oleg Ignatov is citing again an interview that would have been conducted in February 2023, by International Crisis Group, the site where the journalist works and which publishes his analysis, so not so independent or clearly indicated sources… again. Moreover, although Oleg Ignatov induces the idea that the law refers to “political demands for Transnistria’s separation from greater Moldova, making them punishable by imprisonment”, even a bibliographic source cited by the author contradicts this attempt to misinform the readers – the source is only referring to the fact that “Chisinau and Tiraspol differ in their assessment of the Moldovan law on separatism, Interfax, 17 February 2023”. Oleg Ignatov insists on his criticism, regarding the so-called ‘separatism law’, quoting “outspoken criticism from the OSCE” regarding the adoption of this law. In this respect, Ignatov argues using as a source of information, only an unofficial document entitled “Comments on the Criminalization of ‘Separatism’ and Related Criminal Offenses in Moldova”! Things aside, these are merely comments made by civilian experts based on “an unofficial English translation of the amendments to the Criminal Code provided by the OSCE Mission in Moldova”. As for “Western diplomats in Chisinau” who would have criticized the law in question, again not mentioning who they are, only indicating that his publisher had interviewed an “European diplomat in Chisinau”. All these without giving the diplomat’s name or indicating where this interview can be accessed.
Through the article, Oleg Ignatov is switching the attention to the idea of a state of siege, allegedly generated by the Chisinau’s government, and mounted against the citizens of Transnistria. Oleg Ignatov argues that Moldova denies entry to Transnistrian residents who lack a Moldovan passport, even if they are traveling on passports issued by Russia, Ukraine or Romania. Trying to argue his assertion, Oleg Ignatov brings into discussion “Aleksandr Navaric, a former de facto Transnistrian official with a Russian passport, when he tried to return home”, and uses as a source an article named “Transnistrian citizen not allowed home at Chisinau airport, Novosti Pridnestrovya, 16 January 2024”. The author is not indicating the website where the article referred to can be accessed, and of course the source cannot be identified if searched over the Internet. The situation is repeated when the author is exemplifying by “Anna Mamei, a judge from Tiraspol with Russian citizenship”, where he indicates as source: “Moldovan authorities deported the head of the Tiraspol city court Anna Mamei, Novosti Pridnestrovya, 23 January 2024”.
Insisting on the idea of pushing Tiraspol’s limits to a no-return point, Oleg Ignatov is referring to the fact that, at the beginning of 2024 Chisinau had quashed the exemption of Transnistrian businesses from paying duties on exports, ending a 25-year-old arrangement. In this respect, he is quoting a senior Moldovan official, which said: “We cannot tolerate two different regimes: Moldova companies respect the rules, whereas Transnistrian companies don’t. We want to make [Transnistrians] understand that this is the only possible way in the future if we are to join the EU and they want to continue to have access to the EU single market”. Nothing strange, one might consider, but Oleg Ignatov argues that this decision is motivated by Chisinau’s intention „to push Transnistria to comply with rules which would make life more expensive for firms and consumers there”, quoting again ‘Moldovan officials’, who allegedly said that. Oleg Ignatov does not indicate the names of ‘Moldovan officials’, and nor a bibliographic source, where someone interested could find out who these officials are. As accustomed by now, he is only referring to interviews with so-called “Moldovan officials in Chisinau, Brussels and Washington”, which would have been conducted in November 2023-April 2024, by International Crisis Group. So, not so independent or clearly indicated sources again.
Ignatov switches his `right of movement’ argument to an apparently `economic argument’, invoking the fact that Moldovan authorities have demanded that some Transnistrian firms, including one of the region’s largest employers, the Moldovan Metallurgical Plant, are due to pay environmental fees to the Moldovan budget for the first time. What Ignatov does not say is the fact that Chisinau government’s Office for Reintegration stated that implementing the full payment of environmental pollution taxes for all economic agents in the Republic of Moldova is mandatory for creating conditions for fair competition.
Moving his attention to Gagauzia, Oleg Ignatov argues that tensions have escalated after the election of Evghenia Guțul as regional governor, in May 2023. It is no secret, even for the author, that she is a protégé of Ilan Shor, whom the EU and USA have sanctioned as a Russian agent, and that she had met Vladimir Putin during a visit to Moscow, where she accused the Moldovan authorities of usurping the autonomous region’s powers. Ignatov claims that Guțul’s victory came as a result of the fact that all candidates were pro-Russian and against closer European integration. This affirmation is not supported by any evidence. Aside that, the author fails in presenting the reality this time too – amongst candidates, there were actually people who previously advocated for normalizing relations between Comrat and Chisinau, people who were seen to have an equilibrated approach to this fragile relation. By arguing so, and claiming all candidates were pro-Russia, Ignatov tries to induce the idea that the population of Gagauzia is not in favor of Moldova’s EU accession. He even takes a step further and invokes the fact that “many voters in Gagauzia are likely to abstain or cast their ballots against EU accession”. This might be true to some extent, but the author is not supporting his claims by citing any survey carried out in Gagauzia.
And the march of pseudofacts keeps on going throughout the whole article. Just one last example: although the author cites the fact that “the population is largely opposed to President Sandu’s new foreign policy orientation”, Oleg Ignatov does not indicate any source or any survey carried out in this regard in Gagauzia.
This pseudo analysis of Oleg Ignatov is merely a collection of opinions, well put in scene to seem legit, and most probably with the solely scope of casting shadows of doubt over a courageous Moldovan government who tried nothing but to resist to a multiple threat, coming this time only from East – a war in the neighboring Ukraine and a hybrid invader, the Russian Federation. Make no mistake – Russia did not invade Moldova like it did Ukraine, but has been invading since its informational space. This time it does it from Brussels, from the very heart of Europe.